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INTRODUCTION 
 In the modern class action landscape shaped by a formalist Supreme Court 
and an activist Congress, class actions have been shunted from the states to the 
federal courts,1 where they often receive a hostile reception.2 And that grave 
scenario does not even account for the Court’s recent jurisprudence upholding 
class action waivers in consumer contracts that prevent plaintiffs from pursuing 
                                                        
*  Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. My sincere thanks go out to Bob 
Bone, Elizabeth Burch, Josh Davis, Elizabeth Cabraser, Steve Gensler, Myriam Gilles, Bob 
Klonoff, Rick Marcus, Linda Mullenix, Lou Mulligan, and Roger Transgrud; thanks, also, to 
the University of Kansas Law School and Dean Stephen Mazza for generously supporting 
my research. 
1  Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711–15 (2012); Emery G. Lee III 
& Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act on the Federal Courts: 
An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1754 (2008) (con-
cluding that in the wake of CAFA, “federal courts have seen an increase in diversity remov-
als and, especially, original proceedings in the post-CAFA period as a result of the expansion 
of the federal courts’ diversity of citizenship jurisdiction”). 
2  See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008); Robert H. 
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 746 (2013) (analyzing re-
cent developments in federal courts that heightened various class action standards and have 
“made class actions more difficult for plaintiffs to bring”). 
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class actions in any venue.3 But one class action device is thriving, impervious 
(thus far) to either Congressional or Supreme Court intervention: the Rule 
23(c)(4) issue class action.4 
 “Issue class action” is the name for an action that encompasses only com-
ponent parts of class plaintiffs’ claims rather than seeking to adjudicate the en-
tirety of those claims.5 In an issue class action, certain issues may be litigated 
on behalf of the class, while the elements that require individualized adjudica-
tion are excised from the class action for litigation elsewhere.6 This severance 
of individual issues not capable of classwide resolution allows a class action to 
move forward even when it could not survive examination under the mandate 
of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance test7—which requires common issues in the 
class action as a whole to predominate over all issues that would require indi-
vidualized adjudication.8 The predominance criteria of (b)(3) has historically 
doomed a number of ambitious class actions, as federal appellate courts could 
not square the concept of predominance in cases involving a multitude of often 
complex individual elements of plaintiffs’ claims.9 
 But this is exactly why the issue class action has proven to be so appealing. 
According to its proponents, issue class actions automatically satisfy the pre-
dominance test of (b)(3), making certification of an issue class action dramati-
                                                        
3  See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Class 
Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 199 (2015) (opining that “there is every reason to believe 
that businesses will eventually employ [class] waivers en masse . . . all but entirely insu-
lat[ing] themselves from class action liability”); Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After 
Class: Aggregate Litigation in the Wake of AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 623, 627 (2012) (lamenting that “[a]ll of the doctrinal developments . . . circumscribing 
the reach of class actions pale in import” compared to the death blow to consumer class ac-
tions delivered in Concepcion). 
4  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4). 
5  See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Constructing Issue Classes, 101 VA. L. REV. 1855, 1874–
76 (2015) (articulating a component-based approach to consideration of issues raised by 
class claims). See generally Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 
EMORY L.J. 709 (2003) [hereinafter End-Run]; Laura J. Hines, The Unruly Class Action, 82 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 718 (2014) [hereinafter Unruly Class Action]. 
6  See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, The Class Action Counterreformation, 57 STAN. L. REV. 
1475, 1502 (2005); Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. REV. 121, 123 (2015). 
7  See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 6 (“Even when a class has not been permitted to proceed un-
der Rule 23(b), then, litigants can still certify particular issues common to a class under Rule 
23(c)(4).”). 
8  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
9  See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (“Given the greater 
number of questions peculiar to the several categories of class members, and to individuals 
within each category, and the significance of those uncommon questions, any overarching 
dispute about the health consequences of asbestos exposure cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) 
predominance standard.”); Klonoff, supra note 2, at 792 (“[I]n recent years, the courts have 
made it far more difficult to certify class actions under (b)(3) by summarily finding, after 
identifying significant individualized issues, that predominance cannot be satisfied.”). 
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cally easier than an ordinary (b)(3) class action. 10 In my view, Rule 23 does not 
currently provide statutory authorization for this interpretation of Rule 
23(c)(4).11 As I have argued, neither a textualist nor an intentionalist interpreta-
tion of (c)(4) allows its application as an end-run around (b)(3)’s predominance 
requirement.12 Indeed, it is utterly ahistorical to believe that the framers of Rule 
23 had the vaguest notion of a class action that eschewed any obligation to pro-
vide a forum in which class members could adjudicate their claims through to 
final judgment.13 The framers clearly viewed the class action rule as a joinder 
device for joining claims, not subparts of claims.14 
 Yet support for the issue class action is legion, with treatise authors, aca-
demics, and judges alike championing the issue class action.15 Given this virtu-
ally unanimous enthusiasm for the recognition of a Rule 23 issue class action, it 
came as no surprise that the subcommittee tasked by the Advisory Committee 
on Civil Rules to consider amendments to Rule 23 quickly identified issue class 
actions as a top priority.16 Unfortunately, after months of deliberations, the cir-
culation of various codification proposals, and a host of opportunities for inter-
ested stakeholders to weigh in,17 the subcommittee in late 2015 halted its efforts 
to proceed with any amendments related to issue class actions.18 
                                                        
10  See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2012) (“If there are 
no common questions or only common questions, the issue of predominance is automatically 
resolved.”). 
11  See generally End-Run, supra note 5; Unruly Class Action, supra note 5. 
12  See Unruly Class Action, supra note 5, at 729–55. 
13  See id. at 746–55. 
14  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(3) (requiring putative class representative to establish that 
his or her claims are typical of the claims of the class). 
15  See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 21.24 (4th ed. 2004); 5 JAMES WM. MOORE 
ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.86[2] (3rd ed. 2011) (explaining that a “court may 
certify a class action as to particular issues even if the cause of action as a whole would not 
meet the predominance requirement”); 2 WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS 
ACTIONS § 4:26 (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2015); 7AA CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1790 (3d. ed. 2005 & Supp. 2015); Edward F. Sherman, 
“Abandoned Claims” in Class Actions: Implications for Preclusion and Adequacy of Coun-
sel, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 483, 497 (2011). 
16  See, e.g., CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, MINUTES 37 (Apr. 10–11, 2014) (describ-
ing preliminary work of the Rule 23 Subcommittee that produced “a list that identifies three 
topics as potential ‘front burner’ subjects” including settlement classes, issues classes, and 
class notice); see also CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMMITTEE, DRAFT MINUTES 35 (Oct. 30, 
2014) (describing issue class actions “and the relationship between Rule 23(c)(4) and Rule 
23(b)(3)” as one of the Subcommittee’s “front-burner issues”). 
17  See RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES: MIN-CONFERENCE 
ON RULE 23 ISSUES 39–44 (Sept. 11, 2015) [hereinafter RULE 23 MIN-CONFERENCE]; 
ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO THE STANDING COMMITTEE 8 (Jan. 8–9, 2015) 
(describing status of Rule 23 Subcommittee’s continued outreach to “groups for advice that 
will inform the decision whether to recommend that work begin on possible class action 
amendments”). 
18  ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT (Nov. 5–6, 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-rules-
civil-procedure-november-2015 [https://perma.cc/6SAW-SSBK]. 
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 Without overly rehashing concerns about the legitimacy of interpreting the 
current Rule 23 to authorize issue class actions, Part I of this article will none-
theless briefly track the evolution and current state of Rule 23(c)(4). The Rule 
23 Subcommittee’s decision to abandon work on issue class actions apparently 
rested on the faulty premise that a uniform understanding of Rule 23(c)(4) 
presently exists among the circuits, thereby obviating the need for additional 
rule guidance.19 This assertion does not bear up under close scrutiny as few cir-
cuits have definitively addressed the subject, and conflicting interpretations still 
abound among those that have weighed in.20 Wholly apart from the imperative 
of legitimizing a judicially created class action device, the Advisory Commit-
tee’s failure to proceed with its consideration of Rule 23(c)(4) leaves lower 
courts in a continuing state of uncertainty and disuniformity, bereft of much-
needed guidance and clarity. 
 Part II evaluates the varying issue class certification criteria adopted by ap-
pellate courts, as well as those tentatively proposed by the Rule 23 Subcommit-
tee. This divergence of existing approaches to issue class certification under-
scores the need for a rule amendment that clearly and uniformly defines the 
parameters of this new device. Finally, in Part III, the article identifies several 
additional Rule 23 subdivisions that may require amendment, or at least thor-
ough consideration, even if the Advisory Committee chooses not to codify the 
issue class action itself. 
I.   THE ENIGMA OF RULE 23(C)(4) 
Confusion surrounding Rule 23(c)(4) has persisted throughout its fifty-year 
history, puzzling courts and interested stakeholders alike.21 The enigmatic 
wording of Rule 23(c)(4) appears to provide courts with either boundless or ob-
scure authority: “When appropriate, an action may be brought or maintained as 
a class action with respect to particular issues.”22 Indeed, Rule 23(c)(4)’s textu-
al language has been variously characterized, even by its advocates, as “ambig-
                                                        
19  See id. at 90–91 (After “[c]onsiderable discussion,” the Subcommittee reached the con-
clusion that “there is no significant need for such a rule amendment. The various circuits 
seem to be in accord about the propriety of such [issue class action] treatment ‘[w]hen ap-
propriate,’ as Rule 23(c)(4) now says.”). 
20  See infra Part I.B; see also Jenna G. Farleigh, Note, Splitting the Baby: Standardizing Is-
sue Class Certification, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1622 (2011) (contending that “the same 
courts (and even the same judges) reach divergent results on whether or not to allow issue 
class certification in various situations”). 
21  See, e.g., Unruly Class Action, supra note 5, at 719–23; Bruce H. Nielson, Was the 1966 
Advisory Committee Right?: Suggested Revisions of Rule 23 to Allow More Frequent Use of 
Class Actions in Mass Tort Litigation, 25 HARV. J. LEGIS. 461, 483 (1988) (lack of under-
standing of (c)(4)’s text “discourages all but the most innovative and imaginative judges”). 
22  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4); see also Burch, supra note 5, at 1891 (attributing the longstand-
ing divergence of opinion regarding Rule 23(c)(4) to “the scant guidance” offered by its 
“when appropriate” wording). 
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uous,”23 opaque,24 vague,25 confus[ing],26 and “unhelpful.”27 As Rule 23(c)(4)’s 
decades-long journey from obscurity to renaissance amply demonstrates,28 this 
chameleonic provision simply cannot be understood through the plain meaning 
of its text.29 
A.   The Evolution of the Rule 23(c)(4) Issue Class Action 
 Rule 23’s essential certification criteria date back to the major 1966 
amendments that significantly restructured the federal class action rule.30 In or-
der to achieve judicial approval for representational litigation, Rule 23 man-
dates that a class proponent satisfy each of the familiar prerequisites set forth in 
subsection (a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy31—and al-
so meet one of the specific class action typology requirements of subsection 
(b).32 
Rule 23(b)(1) classes can largely be understood as the class action equiva-
lents of certain necessary party joinder provisions reflected in Rule 19,33 and 
Rule 23(b)(2) provides a mechanism for pursuing class-wide injunctive or de-
claratory relief.34 Unlike its mandatory class siblings,35 the (b)(3) class action 
                                                        
23  See Seiner, supra note 6, at 133 (conceding that Rule 23(c)(4) “is ambiguous, and does 
not explain when an issue class is appropriate”). 
24  See Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the 
Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 385 (2005). 
25  See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Ac-
tion, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 238–39 (2003) (opining that Rule 23(c)(4) contemplates 
“some manner of slicing and dicing” within a larger litigation, yet provides no guidance as to 
“[w]hat slicing and dicing is nonetheless ‘appropriate’ ”). 
26  See Klonoff, supra note 2, at 764. 
27  See Scott Dodson, Subclassing, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2351, 2372. 
28  See, e.g., Burch, supra note 5, at 1857 (“After a rocky debut in the 1990s . . . issue classes 
are now experiencing a renaissance . . . .”). 
29  See Unruly Class Action, supra note 5, at 730–31. But see In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search 
Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining that its interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) 
derived from that provision’s “plain language”). 
30  See, e.g., David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm Und 
Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 588 (2013). 
31  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). See generally WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 15, §§ 1759–1769. 
32  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). See generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:1. 
33  See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 1772 (“[Rule 23(b)(1)’s] emphasis on the effect indi-
vidual adjudications may have on parties and absentees is very similar to the standard em-
ployed for determining what persons should be joined under Rule 19 to ensure a just adjudi-
cation of the dispute.”). 
34  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2). See generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15. 
35  The mandatory nature of Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions results from the inability 
of class members to exit the class action. See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 1777 (differ-
entiating (b)(1) and (b)(2) class actions from the “special character of Rule 23(b)(3) classes,” 
which include a “notice requirement and the option to exclude oneself from the judgment”). 
Once a mandatory class action has been certified, no plaintiff included in its definition may 
choose to proceed on an individual basis. Unwilling plaintiffs may dissent only by challeng-
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must include reasonable notice to potential class members offering the right to 
be excluded from class proceedings (and the binding effect of a class judg-
ment).36 To proceed under (b)(3), a putative class plaintiff must establish that 
issues common to class claims “predominate” over individual issues that can be 
resolved only with regard to the circumstances of each class member.37 Rule 
23(b)(3) also demands that a proposed plaintiff class establish that the class ac-
tion is “superior” to other adjudicative alternatives.38 
Living up to its framers’ characterization as the most “adventuresome” of 
the class action vehicles promulgated by the 1966 amendments,39 Rule (b)(3) 
has provided decades of controversy regarding its scope and meaning.40 Be-
cause claims for money damages ordinarily must be pursued through the (b)(3) 
class action,41 (b)(3)’s domination of the class action landscape was inevitable: 
it is quite simply where the money is. Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority and predomi-
nance prongs, however, have proven to be potent obstacles to obtaining class 
status.42 In particular, the majority of federal courts of appeals and the Supreme 
Court have hewed in recent years to a quite stringent interpretation of predomi-
nance.43 
                                                                                                                                 
ing the certification of the class itself or filing objections to the terms of any settlement 
reached on behalf of the class. 
36  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 1777. 
37  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). See generally RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:47. 
38  Id. 
39  See generally Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note to “The Class Action—A Symposium,” 
10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497 (1969); see also Klonoff, supra note 2 at 792 (“When 
(b)(3) was first introduced in 1966, it was considered ‘the most complicated and controver-
sial portion’ of modern Rule 23.”). 
40  See, e.g., Allan Erbsen, From “Predominance” to “Resolvability”: A New Approach to 
Regulating Class Actions, 58 VAND. L. REV. 995, 997 (2005); Marcus, supra note 30, at 592. 
41  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (“Given that 
structure [of Rule 23(b) class types], we think it clear that individualized monetary claims 
belong in Rule 23(b)(3).”); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:47 (“Rule 23(b)(3) class actions 
are money damages class actions.”). 
42  See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 461 (E.D. La. 2006) (“Further-
more, courts have almost invariably found that common questions of fact do not predominate 
in pharmaceutical drug cases.”); Gilles, supra note 24, at 388 (describing judicial “refusal to 
certify [class actions as] driven, in part, by concerns with ‘fairness’ to the defendants,” and 
invocations of (b)(3) predominance as merely “doctrinal cover”); Klonoff, supra note 2, at 
792. 
43  See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997); In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 321 (3d Cir. 2008) (vacating district court’s certifi-
cation of antitrust class on grounds that plaintiff must do more than “demonstrate an ‘inten-
tion’ to try the case in a manner that satisfies the predominance requirement”); In re Initial 
Public Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 43 (2d Cir. 2006) (vacating class certification 
where “individual questions of reliance would predominate over common questions”); 
Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1189 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding dis-
trict court conclusion that predominance could not be met where “variances in state laws 
overwhelm common issues of fact”). 
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It is against this backdrop of judicial resistance to (b)(3) class actions that 
the issue class action came to be seen as a viable mechanism to avoid the pre-
dominance snare altogether.44 In earlier work, I analyzed Rule 23(c)(4) in 
depth, including a textualist evaluation of its statutory language and structural 
placement within Rule 23,45 and an intentionalist examination of its rulemaking 
history.46 That process of statutory interpretation led to the conclusion that the 
current Rule 23(c)(4) does not authorize a form of class action beyond those set 
forth in Rule 23(b).47 
 Until the early 1980s, for example, courts rarely had occasion to even in-
voke Rule 23(c)(4).48 Faced with the challenge and complexities of increasing 
numbers of mass tort claims, however, some innovative judges looked to rein-
vent Rule 23(c)(4) as a workaround to evade the onerous demands of (b)(3) 
predominance.49 From its humble origins as a clarification of the implicit bifur-
cation between common and individual issues in (b)(3) class actions, Rule 
23(c)(4) became reimagined as providing positive authority for certification of 
a so-called “issue class action.”50 Rule 23(c)(4), as thus reconceived, offered 
courts an alternative means of certification for class actions that could not satis-
fy Rule 23(b)(3) due to the presence of individual issues raised by class claims 
that overwhelmed any issues common to the class.51 These courts therefore in-
terpreted Rule 23(c)(4) to allow issue class actions that simply excised any 
component of plaintiffs’ claims that could not be adjudicated on a class wide 
basis.52 Rule 23(c)(4)’s alleged power to isolate issues common to the class 
                                                        
44  See, e.g., Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certifi-
cation of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249 (2002). 
45  See Unruly Class Action, supra note 5, at 729–44; see also End-Run, supra note 5. 
46  See Unruly Class Action, supra note 5, at 744–55; see also RULE 23 MIN-CONFERENCE, 
supra note 17, at 40–41 (showing the rulemaking history of Rule 23(c)(4) renders untenable 
the Rule 23 Subcommittee’s recent assertion that “[s]ince its amendment in 1966, Rule 
23(c)(4) has recognized” an issue class action that countenances class litigation when 
(b)(3)’s vital “predominance [mandate] could not be satisfied”). 
47  See Unruly Class Action, supra note 5, at 766. 
48  See Unruly Class Action, supra note 5, at 725–26. 
49  See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 24, at 381–84 (praising the “inventive” judges of the early 
1980s for “find[ing] ways to use Rule 23 to address mass torts of the day”); see also Arthur 
R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits: Reflec-
tions on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 316–18 (2013) (de-
tailing the inhospitable reception given by federal courts to various Rule 23 innovations). 
50  See, e.g., Gilles, supra note 24, at 388 (“While the drafters of the modern Rule 23 were 
justified in doubting that the legal requirements of the rule would be met in the typical mass 
torts case, given the inevitable individual issues of causation and damages, those concerns 
went by the wayside with the advent of the issue-specific class action pioneered by Judge 
Parker and others.”). 
51  See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 44, at 261–65. 
52  See, e.g., DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC 
GOALS FOR PRIVATE GAIN 24 (2000); Susan E. Abitanta, Bifurcation of Liability and Dam-
ages in Rule 23(b)(3) Class Actions: History, Policy, Problems, and a Solution, 36 SW. L. J. 
743, 750 (1982) (discussing the “new character” of (c)(4) that enables the “separation of is-
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claims and exile from the action all individualized components led courts to as-
sert that issue class actions automatically satisfied (b)(3)’s predominance re-
quirement.53 
Appellate courts ultimately rejected the most prominent of the early issue 
class actions explicitly adopting this interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4).54 Nonethe-
less, the issue class action alternative has continued to thrive among lower 
courts eager to create a “body of federal common law to fill in the gaps.”55 In-
terest in developing the Rule 23(c)(4) issue class grew particularly after the Su-
preme Court in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor56 confirmed a rigorously 
high bar for the satisfaction of predominance.57 Indeed, the increase in federal 
court adoptions of the issue class action in the last decade has been driven pri-
marily by the desire to achieve some class efficiencies even in cases where the 
application of Rule 23(b)(3) predominance would otherwise prove fatal to certi-
fication.58  
                                                                                                                                 
sues in a (b)(3) [class] action” as “a means of achieving class certification”); Unruly Class 
Action, supra note 5, at 724–25; Romberg, supra note 44, at 261–62. 
53  See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2012), vacated by 
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (2013) (“If there are no common questions 
or only common questions, the issue of predominance is automatically resolved.”); JAY 
TIDMARSH, & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, MODERN COMPLEX LITIGATION 490 (2d ed. 2010) (“By 
definition, these common issues would predominate, because only the common issues are 
litigated on a class-wide basis.”); Romberg, supra note 44, at 289 (“For many years follow-
ing the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the dominant (if relatively unexplored) position of 
courts and commentators was that certifying only the common issues in a case automatically 
resulted in predominance, or at least resulted in predominance unless the common issues 
could not feasibly be severed from the individual issues.”); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Class Ac-
tions and Limited Vision: Opportunities for Improvement Through a More Functional Ap-
proach to Class Treatment of Disputes, 83 WASH. U.L. REV. 1127, 1231 (2005) (opining that 
“the issue class action was not intended to be subject to the predominance requirement im-
posed upon class certification decisions affecting the entire lawsuit”). 
54  See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996); In re 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1296–97 (7th Cir. 1995); In re N. Dist. of Cal. 
Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 855–56 (9th Cir. 1982); see also, 
Burch, supra note 5, at 1891 (noting that the initial attempts at issue class certification were 
“haphazard and varied.”). 
55  See, e.g., Burch, supra note 5, at 1891. 
56  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997) (“The Rule 23(b)(3) predom-
inance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudica-
tion by representation.”). See Cabraser, supra note 6; see also Sherman supra note 15, at 
498. 
57  See, e.g., In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310–11 (3d Cir. 2008); 
End Run, supra note 5, at 750–51; Romberg, supra note 44, at 295. 
58  See, e.g., Miller, supra note 49, at 319 n.125 (predicting more “single-issue class actions 
under Rule 23(c)(4)” in the wake of the Court’s rejection of the Rule 23(b)(2) class action in 
Wal-Mart); Alex Parkinson, Comcast Corp. v. Behrend and Chaos on the Ground, 81 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1233 (2014) (liberal use of Rule 23(c)(4) is a means of bypassing Com-
cast); Sherman, supra note 15 at 498 (“Issues classes have been particularly attractive to 
class action attorneys as a way to keep individual questions from predominating, so as to sat-
isfy the ‘predominance of common questions’ requirement for a Rule 23(b)(3) class ac-
tion.”). 
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The Supreme Court since Amchem has consistently offered a strict and 
rule-based vision of Rule 23, and has been particularly insistent about the im-
portance of scrutinizing Rule 23(b)(3) class actions to ensure satisfaction of the 
predominance prong.59 In its recent decision in Halliburton Company v. Erica 
P. John Fund, Inc., for example, the Court emphasized both the rigor with 
which lower courts should approach class certification and the special role of 
predominance in that analysis. The Court stated, 
our recent decisions governing class action certification under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 23 . . . have made clear that plaintiffs wishing to proceed 
through a class action must actually prove—not simply plead—that their pro-
posed class satisfies each requirement of Rule 23, including (if applicable) the 
predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). . . . In securities class action cases, 
the crucial requirement for class certification will usually be the predominance 
requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).60 
In the nearly two decades that have elapsed since the Rule 23(c)(4) circuit 
first arose,61 the Court has declined several opportunities to resolve the contest-
ed scope and meaning of Rule 23(c)(4).62 In 2013, in the wake of its decision in 
Comcast Corporation v. Behrend,63 for example, the Court granted certiorari, 
                                                        
59  See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 6, at 153 (explaining that while there may be no “complete 
substitute for the traditional Rule 23(b) class action . . . in assessing the legal landscape post 
Wal-Mart, issue class certification is the best remaining tool available for workers to pursue 
systemic employment discrimination claims.”). 
60  134 S. Ct. 2398, 2412 (2014); see also Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 
(2013) (“Rule 23(b)(3), as an “ ‘adventuresome innovation,’ ” is designed for situations “ ‘in 
which “class-action treatment is not as clearly called for,” ’ ” . . . [which] explains Congress’s 
addition of procedural safeguards for (b)(3) class members beyond those provided for (b)(1) 
or (b)(2) class members (e.g., an opportunity to opt out), and the court’s duty to take a 
“ ‘close look’ ” at whether common questions predominate over individual ones.”) (citations 
omitted); Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1199 (2013) (de-
termining if reliance in securities law claim had to be determined on an individual-by-
individual basis, “reliance issues would predominate in such a lawsuit. The litigation, there-
fore, could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(3) as a class action.”) (citation omitted); Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2558 (2011) (distinguishing Rule 23(b)(2) class 
actions from those certified pursuant to Rule 23(b)(3), which “allows class certification in a 
much wider set of circumstances but with greater procedural protections [such as] . . . pre-
dominance, superiority, mandatory notice, and the right to opt out”). 
61  Compare Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Even if 
the common questions do not predominate over the individual questions so that class certifi-
cation of the entire action is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate 
cases to isolate the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment 
of these particular issues.”), with Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th 
Cir. 1996) (“The proper interpretation of the interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and 
(c)(4) is that a cause of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of 
(b)(3).”). 
62  See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McReynolds, 133 S. Ct. 338 
(2012) (denial of certiorari petition challenging issue class action certification); Pella Corp. 
v. Saltzman, 562 U.S. 1178 (2011) (same);. H&R Block, Inc. v. Carnegie, 543 U.S. 1051 
(2005) (same); Grady v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 516 U.S. 867 (1995) (same). 
63  See generally 133 S. Ct. at 1426. 
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vacated and remanded two class actions certified pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4).64 
But when both issue class actions were subsequently reaffirmed by the lower 
courts on remand,65 the Court rejected renewed petitions for certiorari, failing 
once again to clarify the role of Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and Rule 
23(c)(4).66 Given its historically cautious approach to ambitious interpretations 
of Rule 23, the Court may be disinclined to endorse an expansive role for Rule 
23(c)(4), but explication of any kind from the Court would at least help guide 
lower courts’ understanding of this novel class device. 
B.   Missed Opportunity for Codification and Rule Guidance 
 Clarity might have been accomplished through the Rules Enabling Act 
rulemaking process, as the Civil Rules Advisory Committee directed a special 
project Rule 23 Subcommittee to consider possible amendments to Rule 23. As 
the Advisory Committee summarized in its Minutes from April of 2014, the 
subject of issue class actions qualified as a top priority among such potential 
Rule 23 amendments because “[d]ifferent circuits treat Rule 23(c)(4) different-
ly. Serious questions arise from integration of Rule 23(c)(4) with the predomi-
nance criterion of Rule 23(b)(3).”67 Again, in December of 2014, the Advisory 
Committee noted that “[t]he role of ‘issues’ classes under Rule 23(c)(4) has 
long seemed uncertain to many observers, including the relation to the ‘pre-
dominance’ requirement in Rule 23(b)(3).”68 And in April of 2015, the Adviso-
ry Committee reiterated concerns about Rule 23(c)(4): “The relationship of 
Rule 23(c)(4) issues classes to the predominance requirement in Rule 23(b)(3) 
has been a longstanding source of disagreement.”69 
 In November of 2015, however, the Rule 23 Subcommittee ultimately de-
cided to withdraw its efforts to codify the issue class action based on its conclu-
sion that “the various circuits seem to be in accord about the propriety of [issue 
                                                        
64  See Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 
133 S. Ct. 2768 (2013). In her dissenting opinion in Comcast, Justice Ginsburg cited Rule 
23(c)(4) in a footnote for the proposition that Rule 23(b)(3) class actions often included bi-
furcation of common liability issues from individualized damages determinations. 133 S. Ct. 
at 1437 n.* (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
65  See In re Whirlpool Corp., 722 F.3d 838, 861 (6th Cir. 2013); Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & 
Co., 727 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2013). 
66  See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014) (denying petition for certio-
rari); Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014) (same). 
67  See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES OF APRIL 2014 MEETING 37 (Apr. 2014), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-
civil-procedure-april-2014 [https://perma.cc/786Q-GRTX]. 
68  See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., REPORT TO COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 10 (Dec. 2014), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-
reports/advisory-committee-rules-civil-procedure-december-2014 [https://perma.cc/3VNU-
MR7E]. 
69  CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., MINUTES OF APRIL 2015 MEETING 40 (Apr. 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/meeting-minutes/advisory-committee-rules-
civil-procedure-april-2015 [https://perma.cc/9Q2M-HEA3]. 
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class certification] ‘[w]hen appropriate,’ as Rule 23(c)(4) now says.”70 The ap-
pellate courts, however, have not reached consensus regarding the propriety 
and contours of the issue class action.71 
 The circuit split to which the Advisory Committee referred grew out of the 
Fifth Circuit’s explicit rejection of Rule 23(c)(4) as an end-run around (b)(3)’s 
predominance in Castano v. American Tobacco Company : 
Severing the defendants’ conduct from reliance under rule 23(c)(4) does not 
save the class action. A district court cannot manufacture predominance through 
the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4). The proper interpretation of the interaction 
between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that a cause of action, as a whole, must 
satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) and that (c)(4) is a housekeeping 
rule that allows courts to sever the common issues for a class trial. . . . Reading 
rule 23(c)(4) as allowing a court to sever issues until the remaining common is-
sue predominates over the remaining individual issues would eviscerate the pre-
dominance requirement of rule 23(b)(3); the result would be automatic certifica-
tion in every case where there is a common issue, a result that could not have 
been intended.72 
Citing Castano as binding precedent, the Fifth Circuit reiterated this view of 
Rule 23(c)(4) in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Company.73 
In the intervening years since Castano, the Second,74 Third,75 Sixth,76 and 
Seventh77 Circuits have issued opinions contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s interpre-
                                                        
70  See CIVIL RULES ADVISORY COMM., RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT 91 (Nov. 5–6, 
2015), http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/advisory-committee-
rules-civil-procedure-november-2015 [https://perma.cc/7TKP-RQ79]; see also Burch, supra 
note 5, at 1891–93 (describing “emerging consensus” among lower courts surrounding Rule 
23(c)(4) issues classes). 
71  See, e.g., Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 200 n.25 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“The interaction between the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a) and (b) 
and the authorization of issues classes under Rule 23(c)(4) is a difficult matter that has gen-
erated divergent interpretations among the courts.”); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:91 
(“[C]ourts and commentators are sharply split on when issue certification is proper under 
Rule 23(c)(4).”). 
72  Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745–46 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omit-
ted). 
73  Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 422 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Thus, under the 
plaintiffs’ theory, certification of the first stage of the pattern or practice claim would be ap-
propriate presumably because individual-specific issues would be ‘severed’—but only tem-
porarily—under Rule 23(c)(4), making issues common to the class predominant (at least 
theoretically) for the purposes of meeting the (b)(3) requirements. But such an attempt to 
‘manufacture predominance through the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4)’ is precisely what 
Castano forbade.”). 
74  In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006). 
75  Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 272–73 (3d Cir. 2011) (adopting expansive 
view of Rule 23(c)(4) but upholding district court’s rejection of issue class certification 
“[g]iven the inability to separate common issues from issues where individual characteristics 
may be determinative”). 
76  In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 860 (6th 
Cir. 2013). 
77  Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2012). 
16 NEV. L.J. 625, HINES - FINAL.DOCX 4/12/16  6:07 PM 
636 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:625  
tation, finding that Rule 23(c)(4) does provide authority for the certification of 
an issue class action even when the range of issues necessary to resolve a class 
claim that would otherwise fail (b)(3)’s predominance criteria. While several 
sister circuits have asserted generalized support for the concept of an issue 
class, perhaps resulting in a mistaken impression of consensus, close examina-
tion of those cases reveals that none actually approved certification of an issue 
class action that failed Rule 23(b)(3) predominance as a whole.78 
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., for ex-
ample, created the initial Rule 23(c)(4) circuit split by expressly rejecting the 
Fifth Circuit’s interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4) in Castano. The court held that 
“[e]ven if the common questions do not predominate over the individual ques-
tions so that class certification of the entire action is warranted, Rule 23 author-
izes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate the common issues under 
Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of these particular issues.”79 
Yet in spite of its embrace of Rule 23(c)(4) to support class certification even 
without predominating common issues, the Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded 
the class action on appeal in Valentino, finding that the district court had 
“abused its discretion by not adequately considering the predominance re-
quirement before certifying the class.”80 
The Fourth Circuit offered similarly strong rhetoric about Rule 23(c)(4) in 
Gunnells v. Healthplan Services., Inc., but utilized Rule 23(c)(4) merely to cer-
tify plaintiffs’ entire claims against one defendant and declined to certify at all 
claims against another set of defendants: “All other courts have explicitly or 
implicitly endorsed an interpretation of (c)(4) that considers whether Rule 23’s 
predominance requirement is met by examining each cause of action inde-
pendently of one another, not the entire lawsuit, as the dissent would.”81 Stress-
ing its view of “the continuing vitality of Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance re-
quirement,” the court explained that it had “scrupulously analyzed whether 
                                                        
78  See, e.g., In re St. Jude Med., Inc., 522 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted) 
(“Even courts that have approved ‘issue certification’ have declined to certify such classes 
where the predominance of individual issues is such that limited class certification would do 
little to increase the efficiency of the litigation. . . . Given the individual issues discussed 
above, we think this is such a case.”); Klay v. Humana, Inc., 382 F.3d 1241 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(applying Rule 23(c)(4) to certify one class claim in which common issues predominated 
over individual issues while denying certification of a second class claim that lacked such 
predominance). 
79  Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing In re N. 
Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prod. Liab. Litig., 693 F.2d 847, 856 (9th Cir. 1982)). 
80  Id. (“Here, the certification order merely reiterates Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance re-
quirement and is otherwise silent as to any reason why common issues predominate over in-
dividual issues certified under Rule 23(c)(4)(A). There has been no showing by Plaintiffs of 
how the class trial could be conducted.”). 
81  Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 441 (4th Cir. 2003). 
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Plaintiffs’ claims against [one defendant] . . . taken as a whole, satisfies all of 
Rule 23’s requirements, including predominance.”82 
 The Subcommittee seems to have accepted recent suggestions that the Fifth 
Circuit has altered its express rejection of (c)(4) as procedural tool to avoid 
(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues predominate over individual issues 
raised by class claims.83 Yet the Fifth Circuit has never expressly overruled its 
Rule 23(c)(4) precedents, and could only do so through an en banc proceeding:  
It is a well-settled Fifth Circuit rule of orderliness that one panel of our court 
may not overturn another panel’s decision, absent an intervening change in the 
law, such as by a statutory amendment, or the Supreme Court, or our en banc 
court. Indeed, even if a panel’s interpretation of the law appears flawed, the rule 
of orderliness prevents a subsequent panel from declaring it void.84 
 Moreover, none of the Fifth Circuit’s more recent citations to Rule 23(c)(4) 
evidences the alleged retreat from its prior holdings that class claims as a whole 
must satisfy (b)(3)’s predominance requirement.85 The court’s decision in the 
BP oil spill litigation, In re Deepwater Horizon, for example, has been cited as 
confirmation that the court has reversed course on its interpretation of Rule 
23(c)(4).86 Yet the court in Deepwater simply rejected the specious argument 
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast required class plaintiffs to pro-
vide a damages model obviating the need for any individualized damages adju-
dication. 
As we stated in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. AT&T Corp., . . . “[e]ven wide disparity 
among class members as to the amount of damages,” does not preclude class 
certification . . . . Accordingly, as we recognized in Steering Committee v. Exxon 
Mobil Corp, it is indeed “possible to satisfy the predominance . . . requirements 
of Rule 23(b)(3) in a mass tort or mass accident class action” despite the particu-
lar need in such cases for individualized damages calculations. On this basis, 
therefore, we have previously affirmed class certification in mass accident cases, 
                                                        
82  Id. at 443; see also id. at n.16 (explaining that “the common issues in the certified cause 
of action . . . predominate over the individual issues involved in that cause of action”). 
83  See, e.g., Burch, supra note 5, at 1891–92; Patricia Bronte et al., “Carving at the Joint”: 
The Precise Function of Rule 23(c)(4), 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 745, 746–52 (2013) (arguing that 
any circuit split on the meaning of Rule 23(c)(4) “has all but vanished” because “[r]ecent 
decisions confirm that the Fifth Circuit is in accord with the consensus view of the other cir-
cuits”). 
84  Spong v. Fid. Nat’l Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 787 F.3d 296, 305 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting Ja-
cobs v. Nat’l Drug Intelligence Ctr., 548 F.3d 375, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)). 
85  See, e.g., In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 816 (5th Cir. 2014). 
86  See, e.g., Burch, supra note 5, at 1891–92 & n.165 (“For a while the Fifth Circuit consist-
ently adhered to the latter view [of the role of predominance in Rule 23(c)(4) certification], 
but recently changed course in In re Deepwater Horizon.”); Seiner, supra note 6, at 134 & 
n.120 (2015) (noting Deepwater Horizon as a recent example of the Fifth Circuit’s more “re-
laxed” approach to the authorization of issue class actions in the absence of (b)(3) predomi-
nance); PUB. JUSTICE, COMMENTS ON RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE RULE SKETCHES 7 (Sep. 8, 
2015), www.uscourts.gov/file/18414/download [https://perma.cc/73M7-9X7N] (stating that 
“it is unclear whether Castano is still good law in the Fifth Circuit” after Deepwater Hori-
zon). 
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as in other cases in which “virtually every issue prior to damages is a common 
issue.”87 
Indeed, the Fifth Circuit emphasized that “even without a common means of 
measuring damages, in the district court’s view, these common issues nonethe-
less predominated over the issues unique to individual claimants.”88 
 The continuing uncertainty and disuniformity among the lower courts re-
garding the scope of Rule 23(c)(4) issue class actions can perhaps best be 
demonstrated through examination of the diverse approaches to issue class cer-
tification taken by the circuit courts.89 Part II will address these, as well as con-
sider the three proposals promulgated by the Rule 23 Subcommittee before it 
halted its issue class action codification project.90  
                                                        
87  Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 815–16 (citations omitted). Indeed, every circuit thus far 
has rejected invitations to interpret Comcast as requiring plaintiffs to set forth a class damag-
es model to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) predominance. See, e.g., Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 
F.3d 401, 407 (2d Cir. 2015) (“Comcast, then, did not hold that a class cannot be certified 
under Rule 23(b)(3) simply because damages cannot be measured on a classwide basis.”); In 
re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 23 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Comcast did not require that 
plaintiffs show that all members of the putative class had suffered injury at the class certifi-
cation stage—simply that at class certification, the damages calculation must reflect the lia-
bility theory.”); Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (reading 
Comcast to hold only that class plaintiffs “must be able to show that their damages stemmed 
from the defendant’s actions that created the legal liability”). 
88  Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d at 816 (emphasis added). 
89  See, e.g., Burch, supra note 5, at 1892 (listing circuit courts that “have each taken various 
approaches that facilitate issue classes to different degrees”). 
90  Public comments submitted by interested parties to the Subcommittee also reveal the per-
sistence of disagreement regarding the proper interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4). Compare PUB. 
CITIZEN LITIG. GROUP, COMMENT TO THE RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CIVIL RULES 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON BEHALF OF PUBLIC CITIZEN LITIGATION GROUP 7 (Apr. 9, 2015), 
www.uscourts.gov/file/17969/download [https://perma.cc/CM89-YLDD] (“[W]e support the 
proposals of a number of commenters that Rule 23(c)(4) be clarified to provide that an issue 
class may be certified even where common issues do not predominate for the case as a 
whole.”); and PUB. JUSTICE, COMMENTS ON RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE RULE SKETCHES 5 (Sept. 
8, 2015), www.uscourts.gov/file/18414/download [https://perma.cc/YPG6-Y72Z] (“Al-
though the vast majority of courts to have interpreted Rule 23(c)(4) have done so correctly, 
there remains some confusion surrounding the Rule, and the topic continues to be litigated 
vigorously.”); with DEF. RESEARCH INST., COMMENT TO THE RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE, 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 27 (Sept. 10, 2015), 
www.uscourts.gov/file/18419/download [https://perma.cc/3JPX-VSCG] (“DRI submits that 
the concept of issue classes should be eliminated from Rule 23 altogether. Alternatively, the 
rule should be amended to at least make it explicit that all of rule 23(b)’s existing require-
ments apply with full force to issue classes.”); and LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMMENT 
TO THE RULE 23 SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES, FROM 
CONCEPTUAL SKETCHES TO A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO AMEND RULE 23: THOUGHTS ON THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE’S IDEAS FOR REFORM 13 (Oct. 9, 2015), 
www.uscourts.gov/file/18531/download [https://perma.cc/V2DH-WKFX] (“The role of is-
sue class certification needs to be clarified, not expanded.”). 
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II.   PROPOSED CERTIFICATION STANDARDS 
Among the appellate courts that have fully adopted the issue class action, 
three issue class certification standards have emerged. Each court has proposed 
a somewhat different answer to the question: When is it “appropriate” to certify 
a Rule 23(c)(4) class action that could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(3)? For 
the Second Circuit, issue class certification depends upon whether the issue or 
issues would materially advance the litigation.91 The Third Circuit also adopted 
a material advancement standard, but has also established a detailed, multi-
factor test for determining material advancement that must be applied by lower 
courts in the circuit.92 Finally, the Seventh Circuit has been operating with the 
loosest approach to issue certification, approving certification if a court 
identifies common issues that could be usefully tried on a class basis, 
apparently irrespective of the complexity or quantity of individual issues that 
remain to be adjudicated.93 
On the rulemaking front, the Rule 23 Subcommittee tentatively suggested 
three alternative models of issue class action codification, two of which 
adopted the material advancement standard.94 The remaining codification 
model would simply have eliminated the requirement of (b)(3) predominance 
for Rule 23(c)(4) issue class actions, perhaps paralleling the Seventh Circuit’s 
less guided approach.95 Each of these Rule 23(c)(4) standards will be addressed 
in turn below. 
A.   Material Advancement Test 
In 2006, the Second Circuit became the first appellate court to approve a 
class action explicitly pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4).96 Acknowledging the apparent 
circuit split between the Fifth and Ninth Circuits on recognition of the issue 
class action, the court in In re Nassau County Strip Search Cases held that “a 
court may employ subsection (c)(4) to certify a class as to liability regardless of 
whether the claim as a whole satisfies Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance require-
ment.”97 
                                                        
91  McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other 
grounds by Bridge v. Phx. Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). 
92  Gates v. Rohm & Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011) (“This non-exclusive list of 
factors should guide courts as they apply Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4).”). 
93  See, e.g., Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359, 361–63 (7th Cir. 2012). 
94  See RULE 23 MIN-CONFERENCE, supra note 17, at 39–41. 
95  Id. at 40–41 (proposing alternative amendment to Rule 23(b)(3) that would explicitly ex-
empt classes certified pursuant to Rule 23(c)(4) from requirement that common issues pre-
dominate over individual issues). 
96  In re Nassau Cty. Strip Search Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2006). 
97  Id. The Second Circuit presaged its position on Rule 23(c)(4) five years earlier, in Robin-
son v. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co., where it found that the district court had abused 
its discretion by not utilizing Rule 23(c)(4) to certify certain liability issues in a pattern-or-
practice employment discrimination case. 267 F.3d 147, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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Despite its early support for the issue class action, however, the Second 
Circuit has approved few such class actions. In McLaughlin v. American To-
bacco Company, for example, the court acknowledged its power under Nassau 
County to utilize Rule 23(c)(4) to certify an issue class action, but declined to 
do so in the case at hand. The court stated that “given the number of questions 
that would remain for individual adjudication, issue certification would not ‘re-
duce the range of issues in dispute and promote judicial economy.’ ”98 The Se-
cond Circuit in McLaughlin firmly established material advancement as the 
proper standard for issue class certification, holding that “the issue of defend-
ants’ scheme to defraud, would not materially advance the litigation because it 
would not dispose of larger issues such as reliance, injury, and damages.”99 
In a later fraud class action, Dungan v. Academy at Ivy Ridge, the Second 
Circuit similarly upheld the denial of a proposed Rule 23(c)(4) issue class ac-
tion.100 The Second Circuit found that the district court “accurately identified 
and applied this Circuit’s standard for Rule 23(c)(4) issue certification [in de-
termining] . . . that the significance of individualized issues of reliance, causa-
tion, and damages in this case meant that issue certification ‘would not mean-
ingfully reduce the range of issues in dispute and promote judicial 
economy.’ ”101  
More recently, the Second Circuit has issued opinions both rejecting and 
affirming Rule 23(c)(4) issue class actions. In Johnson v. Nextel Communica-
tions, Inc., for example, the Second Circuit vacated a district court’s determina-
tion that the resolution of issues common to the class would materially advance 
the litigation and thereby warranted Rule 23(c)(4) issue class certification.102 
To the contrary, explained the court, “[b]ecause liability for a significant bloc 
of the class members and damages for the entire class must be decided on an 
individual basis, common issues do not predominate over individual ones and a 
                                                        
98  522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008), abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phx. Bond & 
Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008) (quoting Robinson, 267 F.3d at 168); see also In re Methyl 
Tertiary Butyl Ether (“MTBE”) Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“[F]inally, plaintiffs do not show that issue certification will materially advance this litiga-
tion.”). 
99  522 F.3d at 234. The material advancement standard derives from a Western Missouri 
case from 1985, In re Tetracycline Cases, where the district court judge invoked that concept 
in determining the proposed class action satisfied the (b)(3) predominance requirement. 107 
F.R.D. 719, 727, 732, 735 (W.D. Mo. 1985). The language in Tetracycline on material ad-
vancement had been cited favorably by the Second Circuit’s first opinion addressing Rule 
23(c)(4). Robinson, 267 F.3d at 167. 
100  344 F. App’x. 645, 647–48 (2d Cir. 2009). 
101  Id. at 648. 
102  780 F.3d 128, 147–48 (2d Cir. 2015); see also Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 293 
F.R.D. 660, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 293 F.R.D. 578, 589 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013)) (certifying issue class action based on finding that “resolution of the par-
ticular common issues would materially advance the disposition of the litigation as a 
whole”). 
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class action is not a superior method of litigating the case.”103 Citing Nassau 
County, however, the Second Circuit in Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc. upheld the 
district court’s determination that “although the individualized nature of the 
damages inquiry would defeat Rule 23(b)(3) predominance in the case as a 
whole, Rule 23(b)(3) predominance was satisfied with respect to issue of liabil-
ity alone. That conclusion was within the district court’s discretion.”104 
 Material advancement appears to be the leading standard among federal 
district courts105 and commentators alike.106 The American Law Institute (ALI) 
has also promulgated a “material advancement” standard for issue class actions 
in its Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.107 This open-ended ap-
proach to issue class certification, however, provides little guidance regarding 
whether issue certification would “materially advance” the litigation and there-
fore fall within (c)(4)’s “when appropriate” umbrella. 
 To some degree, the material advancement test can be understood as a sort 
of “predominance lite.” Courts have found Rule 23(b)(3) predominance to be 
satisfied whenever “significant” or “substantial” common issues can be re-
solved on a class-wide basis, despite the presence of issues in the class as a 
whole that necessitate individual adjudication.108 The confluence of the pre-
dominance test and the issue class action “material advancement” test is highly 
                                                        
103  Johnson, 780 F.3d at 148. 
104  602 F. App’x. 3, 7 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted); see also Jacob v. Duane Reade, Inc., 
293 F.R.D. 578, 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“In other words, Rule 23(c)(4) certification must ‘ma-
terially advance a disposition of the litigation as a whole’ in order to be warranted.”). As a 
general matter, district courts in the Second Circuit have viewed the issue class action favor-
ably. See Charron v. Pinnacle Group N.Y. L.L.C., 269 F.R.D. 221, 242 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(“Certifying a [l]iability [c]lass of damages-seeking tenants will materially advance this liti-
gation . . . . Issue certification is especially appropriate in a RICO case like this one, where 
[d]efendants’ liability can be determined once, on a class-wide basis, through common evi-
dence.”). But see Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 269 F.R.D. 252, 
266 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). See generally Jacob, 293 F.R.D. 578. 
105  See, e.g., In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 292 F.R.D. 652, 667 (D. 
Kan. 2013); Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank, 269 F.R.D. at 256, 266. 
106  See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 15 (“Certification of an issues 
class is appropriate only if it permits fair presentation of the claims and defenses and materi-
ally advances the disposition of the litigation as a whole.”); Burch, supra note 5 at 1893–96; 
Klonoff, supra note 2, at 812 (“The ‘materially advance’ test urged by some courts and 
commentators is a sensible one.”). 
107  AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02 (2010). 
108  See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus. Inc., 782 F.2d 468, 472 (5th Cir. 1986) (“In order to 
‘predominate,’ common issues must constitute a significant part of the individual cases.”); In 
re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1010 (3d Cir. 1986) (“There may be cases in which 
class resolution of one issue or a small group of them will so advance the litigation that they 
may fairly be said to predominate.”); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 307 F.R.D. 
630, 645 (S.D. Fla. 2015); Morales v. Greater Omaha Packing Co., 266 F.R.D. 294, 304 (D. 
Neb. 2010). 
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revealing.109 The chief rationale for the development of the issue class action 
has been that Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance criteria is simply too difficult for 
many complex class actions to meet.110 The reason some courts have endeav-
ored to interpret predominance in the least exacting manner is to achieve the 
same result—class certification for cases that are not, on their face, obvious 
candidates for a finding of predominating common issues.111 The advent of the 
material advancement standard, indeed, dates to the 1980s, the era in which 
predominance came to be viewed as too rigorous a test for modern class ac-
tions.112  
 Materiality is always a slippery concept, but it implies something objec-
tively important.113 In the wake of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, however, 
one wonders whether the resolution of any issue that satisfies Rule 23(a)(2) 
commonality would necessarily be deemed to materially advance the underly-
ing litigation.114 In Wal-Mart, the justices intensely debated the role of com-
monality in class action jurisprudence, and how strictly Rule 23(a)(2) ought to 
be interpreted.115 Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia laid out a provocative-
ly stringent set of criteria for finding commonality.116 He argued that Rule 
23(a)(2) commonality required class members to suffer from a common inju-
ry,117 the proposed common issue to be “central” to each class members’ claim, 
and the issue be one that could be decided once (and only once) for all.118 
 This strict interpretation of commonality’s demands provoked intense criti-
cism from the dissenters, who pointed out that no previous opinion interpreting 
Rule 23 had defined commonality so narrowly.119 The impact, of course, might 
                                                        
109  See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 44, at 294–95 (“Predominance instead asks whether the 
class certification, as proposed, would materially advance the fair and efficient resolution of 
the entire controversy.”). 
110  See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
111  See, e.g., Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 469. 
112  See In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 735 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
113  See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., supra note 107, § 2.02(a)(1) (defining the material advance-
ment test satisfied only when the issue certified “address[es] the core of the dispute in a 
manner superior to other realistic procedural alternatives . . . .”). 
114  See generally Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
115  Id. at 2556. (“The dissent misunderstands the nature of [our commonality] analysis. . . . 
We consider dissimilarities not in order to determine (as Rule 23(b)(3) requires) whether 
common questions predominate, but in order to determine (as Rule 23(a)(2) requires) wheth-
er there is ‘[e]ven a single [common] question.’ And there is not here.”). 
116  Id. at 2551. 
117  Id. (“Commonality requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that the class members ‘have suf-
fered the same injury.’ ”). 
118  Id. (“That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of 
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an 
issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.”). But see, A. Ben-
jamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 
B.U. L. REV. 441, 445 (2013) (critiquing Wal-Mart’s restrictive and unsupported interpreta-
tion of Rule 23(a)(2) commonality). 
119  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2562 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
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be to deny class action status to a number of cases that would have satisfied a 
looser standard.120 Justice Ginsberg’s dissenting opinion offered an especially 
strong critique of the majority’s test, arguing that its centrality language, in par-
ticular, distorted commonality’s purpose.121 The relative significance of com-
mon and individual issues in a proposed class action, she explained, is the ex-
clusive purview of (b)(3) predominance, and to import that higher threshold of 
super-commonality, would be to heighten improperly the rulemakers’ inten-
tions for the role of Rule 23(a)(2) commonality.122 
 Therefore, the evolution of the material advancement standard must be un-
derstood in the context of both the ongoing debate about the strictness with 
which courts should interpret commonality and the pressure on courts to loosen 
the demands of predominance. Rule 23(c)(4) has emerged as a counterweight to 
this tension in some respects. If predominance is, as some Rule 23(c)(4) advo-
cates contend, automatically satisfied in an issue class action,123 then that heavy 
burden may be lifted. 
 Yet an issue class action surely cannot be certified whenever a common is-
sue is present, because that could lead to unwieldy and possibly inefficient 
class action certification.124 To assuage concerns about over-utilization of the 
issue class action, courts adopting the “material advancement” test seek to find 
a middle ground. Not every common issue may be certified, it must “materially 
advance” the litigation.125 
 In the context of this potential tightening of commonality’s definition, it 
seems inconceivable that any issue certified as “common” pursuant to (a)(2) 
would not satisfy the notion of a material issue. And if it is a material issue, 
would it not materially advance the litigation as a whole to dispose of it in one 
adjudication rather than multiple (possibly thousands) of proceedings? The 
“advancement” aspect of the test is also poorly defined. Resolution of practical-
ly any issue in a complex class action comprised of hundreds or thousands of 
                                                        
120  See, e.g., Spencer, supra note 118, at 475 (“More important, the common question provi-
sion of Rule 23 imposes not one of the requirements that characterize heightened commonal-
ity after Dukes. In taking this approach, the Court is reviving the nineteenth- and early twen-
tieth-century tradition under the codes of giving strict, narrowing constructions to statutory 
texts expressly drafted and designed to liberalize joinder[, and] . . . is reflective of a wider 
move toward restrictiveness in civil procedure.”). 
121  See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 131 S. Ct. at 2561–66 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part). 
122  See id. at 2565 (“The Court blends Rule 23(a)(2)’s threshold criterion with the more de-
manding criteria of Rule 23(b)(3), and thereby elevates the (a)(2) inquiry so that it is no 
longer ‘easily satisfied.’ ”); see also Spencer, supra note 118, at 475. 
123  See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
124  See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 44, at 296 (recognizing that issue class certification would 
be improper if the common issues “were so minor or tangential that even if the class were to 
succeed as to those issues, it would not advance resolution of the class members’ underlying 
claims”). 
125  See supra notes 98–101 and accompanying text. 
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claimants would “advance” the litigation.126 How “material” must the “ad-
vancement” be? Notable? Significant?127 
 The framers of the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 chose “predominance” as 
one of the two defining criteria for Rule 23(b)(3) class actions, meaning that the 
common issue or issues must be regarded, in some respect, as greater or more 
important than the individual issues raised by the class claims.128 It is not a 
numbers game—there can certainly be a single complex common issue and 
multiple individual issues that are nonetheless formulaic or simple to adjudi-
cate.129 Yet the concept of “greater than” is baked into the predominance test in 
a way that is important to deciphering how the framers viewed Rule 23(b)(3).130  
 Therefore, it is not surprising that the material advancement test, which 
emerged when the predominance requirement became frustratingly inconven-
ient, would be the choice of many courts embracing the issue class action.131 
When courts redefined predominance to simply require material advancement, 
they were trying to extricate the notion of balancing or comparing common 
against individual issues in cases where the outcome of that balance would 
clearly not support a finding of predominance. 
 So the test, originally developed to lessen the demands of predominance, 
may prove useful in issue class actions that intentionally eschew any predomi-
nance requirement at all. If, however, Justice Scalia’s Wal-Mart opinion raising 
the stakes and standards of commonality prevails,132 perhaps the real issue class 
action scrutiny will take place in Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality prerequisite. If a 
common issue can survive such a high commonality threshold, perhaps addi-
tional issue class certification criteria would be redundant. 
                                                        
126  See, e.g., Romberg, supra note 44, at 296 (“It would be the rare case indeed—one obvi-
ously inappropriate for class resolution—in which class-wide resolution of the common is-
sues (rather than repeated resolution in each individual class member’s suit) would fail to 
materially advance the fair and efficient resolution of the underlying controversy . . . .”). 
127  See AM. LAW INST., supra note 107, § 2.02(a)(1) (asserting that the issues certified must 
“generate significant judicial efficiencies.”). 
128  See, e.g., Predominance, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-web 
ster.com/dictionary/Predominance [https://perma.cc/P6NL-EM5W] (defining predominance 
as “the state of being more powerful or important than other people or things” or “a situation 
in which there is a greater number or amount of a particular type of person or thing than of 
other people or things”). 
129  See, e.g., WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 15, at § 1778; Burch, supra note 5, at 1893 (arguing 
that “courts should certify issue class actions even if aggregate treatment as to just one issue 
materially resolves class members’ claims”). 
130  See WRIGHT ET. AL., supra note 15, at § 1778 (“Exactly what is meant by ‘predominate’ 
is not made clear in the rule, however. Nor have the courts developed any ready quantitative 
or qualitative test for determining whether the common questions satisfy the rule’s test. What 
is clear, however, is that it is not sufficient that common questions merely exist, as is true for 
purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), and that the court is under a duty to evaluate the relationship be-
tween the common and individual issues in all actions under Rule 23(b)(3).”). 
131  See, e.g., In re Tetracycline, 107 F.R.D. 719, 727, 735 (W.D. Mo. 1985). 
132  See supra notes 113–21 and accompanying text. 
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B.   Multi-Factor Test 
In Gates v. Rohm and Haas Co., the Third Circuit offered a multi-factor 
test for issue class action certification that tracks the ALI’s Principles of the 
Law of Aggregate Litigation even more closely than the Second Circuit’s mate-
rial advancement test.133 Although the Gates court ultimately upheld the district 
court’s denial of the proposed issue class action, it nonetheless promulgated the 
following “nonexhaustive” list of factors for district courts to consider when 
certifying issue class actions: 
[1]  the type of claim(s) and issue(s) in question;  
[2]  the overall complexity of the case;  
[3]  the efficiencies to be gained by granting partial certification in light of  realis-
tic procedural alternatives;  
[4]  the substantive law underlying the claim(s), including any choice-of-law 
questions it may present and whether the substantive law separates the issue(s) 
from other issues concerning liability or remedy;  
[5]  the impact partial certification will have on the constitutional and statutory  
 rights of both the class members and the defendant(s);  
[6]  the potential preclusive effect or lack thereof that resolution of the proposed  
 issue class will have;  
[7]  the repercussions certification of an issue(s) class will have on the  effective-
ness and fairness of resolution of remaining issues;  
[8]  the impact individual proceedings may have upon one another, including 
whether remedies are indivisible such that granting or not granting relief to any 
claimant as a practical matter determines the claims of others; and 
[9]  the kind of evidence presented on the issue(s) certified and potentially  pre-
sented on the remaining issues, including the risk subsequent triers of fact  will 
need to reexamine evidence and findings from resolution of the common  is-
sue(s).134 
While such a higher level of specificity may serve a beneficial role, the 
problem with such a long list of factors is that some will point in different di-
rections than others, and the test does not offer guidance on the relative priority 
of each of these factors. Can an issue class action be certified if one of the fac-
tors is satisfied? Two? What if there are four that suggest certification but five 
that tilt against? How should courts balance these criteria?135 
On the other hand, the multi-factor test offers much more guidance than the 
open-ended material advancement test, and also brings several factors into the 
decision making process that are not directly related to “advancement” of the 
litigation. The interrelatedness of common and individual issues, for example, 
                                                        
133  655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011). 
134  Id. 
135  See, e.g., Klonoff, supra note 2, at 812 (critiquing the multi-factor approach for providing 
“insufficient guidance, especially given that the myriad factors are not exclusive. The ‘mate-
rial advance’ test accomplishes the essence of what the Third Circuit is trying to achieve, but 
without the complications.”). 
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is a crucial component of issue class action efficiency and fairness.136 As the 
Court established in its 1931 opinion in Gasoline Products Co. v. Champlin Re-
fining Co., the Due Process Clause and the Seventh Amendment’s right to a 
civil jury require that separate trials of issues within the same lawsuit must in-
volve “distinct and separa[te]” issues, with each issue capable of being tried 
fairly without the other.137 The potential for an unconstitutional overlap be-
tween the trials of class and individual issues was most prominently addressed 
by the Seventh Circuit in In re Rhone-Poulenc Roher.138  
Moreover, the multi-factor test includes other valuable considerations, such 
as the court’s ability to manage multiple state law standards and potentially 
challenging choice of law questions.139 These additional and important consid-
erations are not obviously raised by the material advancement standard and few 
courts interpreting that standard have raised or applied such factors.140 So, on 
balance, the more detailed set of guidelines from this multi-factor test may 
prove helpful to other courts searching for issue class criteria, and may recom-
mend themselves to the Advisory Committee’s consideration when it elects to 
codify issue classes. 
C.   Seventh Circuit Test 
 The circuit court most likely to approve issue classes is perhaps the most 
unexpected of Rule 23(c)(4) allies. In 1995, Judge Richard Posner’s scathing 
critique of the issue class certified in In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. struck 
terror in the hearts of plaintiffs’ attorneys and provided powerful ammunition 
to defendants fending off class certification.141 Rhone-Poulenc cited settlement 
pressure that results from class certification as a leading reason for finding that 
the district court abused its discretion: 
And suppose the named plaintiffs . . . win the class portion of this case to the ex-
tent of establishing the defendants’ liability under either of the two negligence 
theories. It is true that this would only be prima facie liability, that defendants 
would have various defenses. But they could not be confident that the defenses 
would prevail. They might, therefore, easily be facing $25 billion in potential li-
ability (conceivably more), and with it bankruptcy. They may not wish to roll 
                                                        
136  See, e.g., RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, §§ 3:18–27. 
137  283 U.S. 494, 499–501 (1931). 
138  In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995). 
139  Gates v. Rohm and Haas Co., 655 F.3d 255, 273 (3d Cir. 2011). 
140  See Burch, supra note 5, at 1897 (acknowledging that “[w]hen state law governs a de-
fendant’s conduct, choice-of-law questions can complicate issue classes,” but nonetheless 
emphasizing that “the need for state law alone should not signal that issue classes are inap-
propriate.”). 
141  Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.2d at 1293; see also Gilles, supra note 24, at 385–86 (characteriz-
ing Judge Posner’s decision in Rhone-Poulenc as a “watershed” moment that “swiftly be-
came the model for other appellate courts in decertifying mass tort classes”). 
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these dice. That is putting it mildly. They will be under intense pressure to set-
tle.142 
In cases where the risk of liability is not so gigantic, however, Judge Pos-
ner has opined that he has “trouble seeing the downside of the limited class ac-
tion treatment.”143 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has developed a unique approach 
to issue classes in a series of opinions upholding the certification of issue clas-
ses under the aegis of Rule 23(c)(4) despite the lack of any particular plan for 
resolution of the individualized issues that must be resolved (somehow and 
somewhere) before a judgment may be entered for individual class members.144  
 Writing for the court in Butler v. Sears Roebuck and Company, Judge Pos-
ner declared that “predominance is automatically resolved” in a Rule 23(c)(4) 
class action that contains “only common questions.”145 When the Supreme 
Court granted certiorari in Butler,146 vacating and remanding the decision in 
light of Comcast,147 the Seventh Circuit on remand reasserted its position that 
issue class actions need not comply with ordinary Rule 23(b)(3) restrictions.148 
Writing for the majority in reaffirming the prior decision, Judge Posner con-
cluded that Comcast’s holding had no relevance to the issue class certified in 
Butler because the class certified in Butler did not include class damages.149 In-
voking Justice Scalia’s Rule 23(a)(2) commonality principles from Wal-Mart, 
Judge Posner emphasized that “[t]here is a single, central, common issue of lia-
bility: whether the Sears washing machine was defective.”150 The remaining 
individualized claim components (proximate cause, injury, damages, and af-
                                                        
142  Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.2d at 1298. 
143  McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 
2012); see also id. at 491 (“If resisting a class action requires betting one’s company on a 
single jury verdict, a defendant may be forced to settle; and this is an argument against defin-
itively resolving an issue in a single case if enormous consequences ride on that resolu-
tion.”); Seiner, supra note 6, at 149 (“Certifying narrow issues in the case would not threaten 
the existence of the company or cause it to settle, and would help to streamline future litiga-
tion in the individual cases.”). 
144  See McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 491; Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 
(7th Cir. 2004); Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003); Miller, 
supra note 49, at 319 (praising the Seventh Circuit’s decision in McReynolds for its robust 
utilization of (c)(4)). See generally Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 
2012); Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010). 
145  See Butler, 702 F.3d at 361. 
146  Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 133 S. Ct. 2768 (2013) (granting certiorari petition). 
147  See generally 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013). The Court had denied several previous petitions 
seeking review of the Seventh Circuit’s expansive interpretation of Rule 23(c)(4). See, e.g., 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. McReynolds, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Pella 
Corp. v. Saltzman, 131 S. Ct. 998 (2011). 
148  See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013). 
149  See id. at 800 (“Furthermore and fundamentally, the district court in our case, unlike 
Comcast, neither was asked to decide nor did decide whether to determine damages on a 
class-wide basis.”). 
150  See id. at 801. 
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firmative defenses) apparently could be “readily determined in individual hear-
ings, in settlement negotiations, or by creation of subclasses.”151 
 In Carnegie v. Household International, Inc., Judge Posner also expressed 
little concern about the fate of individual issues excluded from the Rule 
23(c)(4) issue class: 
Whether particular members of the class were defrauded and if so what their 
damages were are another matter, and it may be that if and when the defendants 
are determined to have violated the law separate proceedings of some character 
will be required to determine the entitlements of the individual class members to 
relief.152 
Although he saw a global settlement as the most likely result of a common is-
sue trial in plaintiffs’ favor, Judge Posner also threw out a host of other possi-
ble means of resolving the individual issues necessary for entry of a final 
judgment for any class member:  
Rule 23 allows district courts to devise imaginative solutions to problems creat-
ed by the presence in a class action litigation of individual damages issues. 
Those solutions include ‘(1) bifurcating liability and damage trials with the same 
or different juries; (2) appointing a magistrate judge or special master to preside 
over individual damages proceedings; (3) decertifying the class after the liability 
trial and providing notice to class members concerning how they may proceed to 
prove damages; (4) creating subclasses; or (5) altering or amending the class.’153 
The Seventh Circuit’s approach to issue class certification thus appears to 
be in conflict with Rule 23(b)(3) jurisprudence requiring plaintiffs to present 
the court at the certification stage with a manageable plan for trying class 
claims.154 Instead, Rule 23(c)(4) frees the court to certify common issues with 
little regard, and certainly no actual plan for the resolution of individual issues. 
Given the likelihood of settlement to which Judge Posner referred,155 this lack 
of concern for the uncertain mode, means, and venue for adjudicating individu-
al issues may make sense as a pragmatic matter, but finds little support in Rule 
                                                        
151  See id. 
152  Carnegie v. Household Int’l Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004). 
153  Id. 
154  Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 186 n.7 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We 
believe that the pre-certification presentation of the aforementioned trial plans represents an 
advisable practice within the class action arena, and we note that such instruments could be 
used by parties and trial courts to facilitate Rule 23(c)(1)(B) compliance regarding the 
claims, issues, or defenses subject to class treatment.”); Klonoff, supra note 2, at 799 (“Of 
course, the burden is on the plaintiff to show, through a precise analysis of the applicable 
laws and a proposed case management plan, that common issues predominate and that the 
trial of the case would be manageable.”). 
155  FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1998 amendment (justifying Rule 23(f) 
interlocutory appeal amendment because certification in some cases “may force a defendant 
to settle rather than incur the costs of defending a class action and run the risk of potentially 
ruinous liability”); In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 
2008) (“[T]he potential for unwarranted settlement pressure ‘is a factor we weigh in our cer-
tification calculus.’ ”). 
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23.156 Rule 23(b)(3), for instance, explicitly identifies the manageability of 
class claims as an important certification consideration.157 
 As an apparent substitute for the balancing of common and individual is-
sues mandated by (b)(3)’s predominance criterion, the Seventh Circuit instead 
counsels that if a proposed class action contains 
genuinely common issues, issues identical across all the claimants, issues more-
over the accuracy of the resolution of which is unlikely to be enhanced by re-
peated proceedings, then it makes good sense, especially when the class is large, 
to resolve those issues in one fell swoop while leaving the remaining, claimant-
specific issues to individual follow-on proceedings.158 
 The “kicker,” according to Judge Posner, is whether the stakes are so high 
in the proposed issue class that defendants will be driven to settlement.159 In 
that event, denial of class certification would be warranted due to “the danger 
that resolving an issue common to hundreds of different claimants in a single 
proceeding may make too much turn on the decision of a single, fallible judge 
or jury.”160 But so long as the court is not faced with an extortionate, industry-
threatening class certification as in Rhone-Poulenc, it would seem in the Sev-
enth Circuit that class certification is proper for any common issue “ ‘the accu-
racy of the resolution’ ” of which is “ ‘unlikely to be enhanced by repeated pro-
ceedings.’ ”161 
This approach tolerates the risk of an inaccurate resolution of the common 
issue impacting all claimants and all claims because the alternative is no resolu-
tion at all—a classic negative value argument. The problem with this approach, 
however, is that absent a settlement that certainly cannot be guaranteed, the 
back end of the issue class action still requires adjudication of those remaining 
individual issues, leaving class members with an only partially resolved claim 
that is likely still more costly to litigate than could be recovered in damages. 
Unless the savings on litigating the common issue represents sufficient gains to 
class members that the remaining issues are no longer more expensive to liti-
gate than the likely recovery, these negative value claims will remain unreal-
ized. Moreover, determining the cost of individual litigation and its likely re-
                                                        
156  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment (“An increasing 
number of courts require a party requesting class certification to present a ‘trial plan’ that 
describes the issues likely to be presented at trial and tests whether they are susceptible of 
class-wide proof.”) cf. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 4:79 (“Whether a party proposing a 
class action must submit a trial plan is therefore a forum-specific question. However, it is fair 
to generalize that, because a party proposing a class bears the burden of demonstrating that 
the class action is manageable, a trial plan may be a helpful tool in discharging that bur-
den.”). 
157  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). 
158  McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 491 (citing 
Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Systems Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003)). 
159  Id. 
160  Id. (“The alternative is multiple proceedings before different triers of fact, from which a 
consensus might emerge; a larger sample provides a more robust basis for an inference.”). 
161  Id. 
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covery also depends on an understanding of how much of any resulting judg-
ment must be allocated to the class action attorneys, either by express arrange-
ment in the Rule 23(h) attorney fee hearing or by quantum meruit principles.162 
In a more recent case, the Seventh Circuit’s analysis more directly refers to 
consideration of the relative significance of the common issue to the remaining 
issues in the litigation, in language evocative of the material advancement prin-
ciple. In Parko v. Shell Oil Company, the court observed, “If resolving a com-
mon issue will not greatly simplify the litigation to judgment, or settlement of 
claims of hundred or thousands of claimants, . . . the delay, and the danger that 
class treatment would expose the defendant or defendants to settlement-forcing 
risk are not costs worth incurring.”163 In other words, the proposed issue certifi-
cation may not be warranted for any genuinely common issue, as may have 
been inferred from earlier iterations of the certification standard, but only as to 
those that would “greatly simplify the litigation to judgment or settlement of 
claims.”164 Apart from the exclusion of cases involving “enormous” risk of lia-
bility generating untenable settlement pressure, it particularly unclear how the 
Seventh Circuit will apply this criteria to certify a common issue with the goal 
of “simplify[ing] the litigation” to settlement. Indeed, the settlement of issues 
rather than claims is largely terra incognito in the world of class actions.165 
The Seventh Circuit’s conception of issue class certification criteria may 
hold sway among other courts, and may represent a pragmatic and socially 
beneficial approach to cases involving uniform defendant misconduct and mul-
titudes of injured plaintiffs. The judicial invention of such a standard, however, 
cannot easily be mapped onto Rule 23(c)(4)’s skimpy “when appropriate” lan-
guage, much less Rule 23(b)(3)’s express predominance and manageability 
commands. In the absence of Advisory Committee guidance, of course, the 
Seventh Circuit will forge ahead in its development of the issue class, hopefully 
confronting many of the as of yet unaddressed aspects of such litigation as fod-
der for the Advisory Committee’s next Rule 23 amendment project. 
III.   INTEGRATING THE ISSUE CLASS ACTION INTO RULE 23 
 Wholly apart from articulating a certification standard for the issue class 
action, other provisions in Rule 23 that were not originally ratified with the is-
sue class action in mind would benefit from Advisory Committee reconsidera-
tion. In 2003, the Committee amended Rule 23 in several respects, providing 
greater detail in some subdivisions, and creating new subdivisions to handle 
class attorney fees and the selection of a class attorney.166 In that set of amend-
                                                        
162  See infra Part III(D). 
163  Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir. 2014). 
164  Id. 
165  See infra Part III(C). 
166  See, e.g., COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE 1 (2002) [hereinafter 2002 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT], 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/committee-reports/advisory-committee-
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ments, the Committee also added the word “issues” into some subdivisions 
where previously the Rule had referred only to “claims.”167 Given the dearth of 
rulemaking history and the absence of meaningful public comment and vetting, 
these insertions of the word “issues” into the Rule 23 provision on certification, 
notice, and settlement cannot be interpreted to actually codify the issue class 
action.168 Nonetheless, they provide a starting point for revamping Rule 23 to 
take the issue class action’s unique characteristics into account. Four subdivi-
sions immediately suggest Committee consideration: Rules 23(c)(2), (c)(3), (e) 
and (h).169 The following section addresses each in turn. 
A.   Rule 23(c)(2) Notice 
 The purpose of the notice commanded by Rule 23(c)(2) is to inform class 
members of the nature of the claims being litigated representationally on their 
behalf, where the case is being litigated, their right to exclude themselves from 
the litigation, the process by which such “opting out” of the class action must 
be achieved (because the default is inclusion in the class), and the binding ef-
fect of any judgment in the absence of their proactive exclusion.170 The 
amendments of 2003 did an admirable job of tasking the courts to draft class 
action notices in a way that is more informative, less “legalese” and confusing, 
and provide greater transparency for absent class members.171 But that task, in 
my view, is made more challenging by the peculiar nature of the issue class ac-
tion.  Absent class members will still have to opt out in order to avoid a binding 
                                                                                                                                 
rules-civil-procedure-may-2002 [https://perma.cc/TUL3-8QH2] (“Rule 23 subdivision (c) is 
substantially rewritten, subdivision (e) is completely rewritten, and subdivisions (g) and (h) 
are new.”). 
167  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment (ex-
plaining that the amendment’s adoption of the term “claims, issues, or defenses of a certified 
class” was intended to “resolve[] the ambiguity in former Rule 23(e)’s reference to dismissal 
or compromise of ‘a class action.’ That language could be—and at times was—read to re-
quire court approval of settlements with putative class representatives that resolved only in-
dividual claims.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1) advisory committee’s note to 2003 
amendment (“A critical need is to determine how the case will be tried. An increasing num-
ber of courts require a party requesting class certification to present a ‘trial plan’ that de-
scribes the issues likely to be presented at trial and tests whether they are susceptible of 
class-wide proof.”). 
168  See 2002 ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 166, at 2 (“The Rule 23 revisions 
address the process for managing a class action on the assumption that a class has been certi-
fied. They do not address the prerequisites or criteria for certification.”). 
169  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2), (c)(3), (e), (h). 
170  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B); see also RUBENSTEIN, supra note 15, § 8:12; WRIGHT, ET AL., 
supra note 15, § 1789 (“[T]he judgment in a class action will include by its terms all the 
class members, except those in a Rule 23(b)(3) action who request exclusion as permitted 
under subdivision (c)(2)(B).”). 
171  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment 
(“The direction that class-certification notice be couched in plain, easily understood lan-
guage is a reminder of the need to work unremittingly at the difficult task of communicating 
with class members.”). 
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negative judgment,172 but their incentive to do so may be too obscure to render 
their failure to act as tantamount to meaningful consent to representational liti-
gation. As confusing as class action notices to recipients in any class action 
case are,173 at least a layperson reading the notice understands that her claim 
will be litigated. At the end of that litigation, if she elects to stay in the class, 
she may receive compensation.174 That process may require her participation to 
some degree, of course, but the path from claim to resolution is laid out and, 
presumably, understood.175 
 In the case of an issue class action, however, class notice requires absent 
plaintiffs to remain in the class or exercise opt out rights for the resolution of an 
issue, perhaps an element or sub-element of a cause of action, that may still re-
quire the filing of individual lawsuits in the event that the class is successful.176 
As the Rule 23 Subcommittee acknowledged, even after a successful litigation 
of the common issue, a host of issues may remain to be litigated on an individ-
ual basis.177 
                                                        
172  But see Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 392 (7th Cir. 2010) (certifying six issues 
pursuant to Rule 23(b)(2) declaratory judgment provision without providing absent class 
members the opportunity to opt out). 
173  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment (“It is dif-
ficult to provide information about most class actions that is both accurate and easily under-
stood by class members who are not themselves lawyers. Factual uncertainty, legal complex-
ity, and the complication of class-action procedure raise the barriers high.”); Shannon R. 
Wheatman &Terri R. LeClercq, Majority of Class Action Publication Notices Fail to Satisfy 
Rule 23 Requirements, 30 REV. LITIG. 53, 57 (2010) (“With the passage of the [2003] plain 
language amendment, the hope was that the world of class action notice would be turned on 
its head and lawyers would take great strides to ensure that class members could finally un-
derstand all of their rights and options.”). 
174  See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 15, § 21.311 (providing guid-
ance regarding the content of class notice, including the need to “describe the relief sought”). 
175  But see Wheatman & Terri R. LeClercq, supra note 173, at 57 (“Many [class] notices 
continue to be written in small, fine print; the notice often features the court’s official-
looking case caption which does not provide any incentive for actual class members to read 
it. If readers can get past the design features that deter reading, they will likely be met with 
large blocks of jargon-filled text that are unintelligible to many laypersons.”). 
176  Indeed, if class members remain burdened with litigation on an individual basis, perhaps 
even the calculus that permitted courts to infer consent in the absence of express exclusion 
can no longer be presumed. This concern regarding the assumptions we make about class 
member consent may strain the concept beyond bounds in the context of the issue class ac-
tion. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 628 (1997) (“[W]e recognize 
the gravity of the question whether class action notice sufficient under the Constitution and 
Rule 23 could ever be given to legions so unselfconscious and amorphous.”); Theodore Ei-
senberg & Geoffrey Miller, The Role of Opt-Outs and Objectors in Class Action Litigation: 
Theoretical and Empirical Issues, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1529, 1561 (2004) (“The data thus sug-
gest that the Shutts notion of consent to jurisdiction based on failure to opt out is fictional.”); 
Laura J. Hines, The Dangerous Allure of the Issue Class Action, 79 IND. L.J. 567, 599 
(2004). 
177  RULE 23 MIN-CONFERENCE, supra note 17, at 42 (recognizing that after “the resolution of 
the common issues . . . a great deal more may need to be done to accomplish that ultimate 
resolution”); id. at 39 (“[T]o complete adjudication of class members’ claims might require 
considerable additional activity.”). 
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 In any event, at the very least the Committee should consider amending 
Rule 23(c)(2) to instruct courts that notice in issue classes must specify which 
components of class claims will be litigated representationally in the class ac-
tion, which components will still require individualized litigation by class 
members following a successful issue class trial, and a description of the scope 
and nature of those individual issues excluded from the class action.178 Moreo-
ver, an issue class notice may also need to inform such class members of their 
obligation, if the class action is successful, to compensate class counsel out of 
any proceeds they may recover in their individual lawsuits.179 
B.   Rule 23(c)(3) Judgment  
 As mentioned above, one of the central achievements of the Rule 23 
amendments in 1966 was to eradicate the one-way intervention of class mem-
bers who could receive the benefits of a successful litigation but avoid the bur-
dens of a defendant verdict.180 The judgment on behalf of the class, win or lose, 
is binding under Rule 23(c)(3) on any class member within the definition of the 
class and, with respect to (b)(3) class actions, who did not exercise the right to 
opt out.181 
 This important provision becomes more complicated in the context of the 
issue class action, as there will be no “judgment” per se but rather only the res-
olution of an issue or issues.182 Whether conceived as the law of the case or is-
sue preclusion, it is not a “judgment” as contemplated in the current Rule 
23(c)(3), which imports the meaning of that term from Rule 54(a).183 Rule 54(a) 
defines judgment as “an order from which an appeal lies,” such as a final deci-
sion subject to appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 or an appealable interlocutory 
order.184 As explained by a leading civil procedure treatise: “Orders that are not 
                                                        
178  See, e.g., id. at 40 (“When certifying an issues class, the court should specify the issues 
on which certification was granted in its order under Rule 23(c)(1)(B) and, for Rule 23(b)(3) 
classes, include that specification in its notice to the class under Rule 23(c)(2)(B)(iii).”); cf 
Wachtel v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 453 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2006) (concluding that 
“Rule 23(c)(1)(B) requires district courts to include in class certification orders a clear and 
complete summary of those claims, issues, or defenses subject to class treatment”). 
179  See infra Part III(D). 
180  See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 1789 (explaining that the 1966 Civil Rules Advisory 
Committee “specifically repudiate[d] the so-called one-way intervention that was permitted 
in ‘spurious’ actions prior to the revision”). 
181  See id.; Eisenberg & Miller, supra note 176, at 1535 (“When opt-out rights are conferred, 
the courts will bind class members to the judgment if they fail to exercise their privilege to 
exclude themselves from the class.”). 
182  See RULE 23 MIN-CONFERENCE, supra note 17, at 39 (“Particularly if the class is success-
ful on that issue, the resolution of that issue often would not lead to entry of an appealable 
judgment.”). 
183  FED. R. CIV. P. 54(a); see also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737 (1976) (ap-
plying Rule 54 jurisprudence on partial summary judgments to class action brought by wom-
en challenging employer’s pregnancy leave policy). 
184  See FED. R. CIV. P. 54(a). 
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appealable under one of those two categories do not qualify as judgments. 
Thus, for example, even though denominated a ‘judgment,’ a nonappealable 
partial or interlocutory summary judgment under Rule 56 does not qualify as a 
judgment under Rule 54(a).”185 Given this longstanding and well understood 
meaning of the term “judgment” and its consistent use and meaning throughout 
the Rules of Civil Procedure,186 amendment to Rule 23(c)(3) would seem an 
important and necessary reform. 
The Rule 23 Subcommittee, recognizing that the resolution of an issue 
class action would often not result in a final and appealable judgment, floated 
the idea of amending Rule 23(f) to permit interlocutory appeal of the resolution 
of a certified issue.187 Rule 23(f)(2), as it was captioned, would have authorized 
immediate appellate review at the discretion of the court of appeals.188 The 
amendment sought to remedy the potential inefficiencies that could result from 
an inability to seek appellate approval of the common issue until after the pos-
sibly lengthy process of adjudicating the individual issues excised from the is-
sue class: “Before the court and parties expend the time and effort necessary to 
complete resolution of the class action, it may be prudent for the court of ap-
peals to review the district court’s resolution of the common issue.”189 The 
Subcommittee included its draft Rule 23(f)(2) proposals in its decision not to 
proceed with any amendments related to issue classes,190 leaving unresolved 
not only the appellate review problem but also the Rule 23(c)(3) “judgment” 
nomenclature. 
C.   Rule 23(e) Settlement 
 This subdivision is one of the most important of Rule 23, as the majority of 
class actions are resolved by settlement rather than litigation.191 The 2003 
                                                        
185  WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 15, § 2651; Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 424 U.S. at 744 (ruling that 
partial summary judgments “are by their terms interlocutory, . . . and where assessment of 
damages or awarding of other relief remains to be resolved have never been considered to be 
‘final’ within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291”). 
186  See, e.g., WRIGHT, ET AL., supra note 15, § 2651 (“[T]he purpose of Rule 54(a) is to de-
fine the term ‘judgment’ for purposes of the federal rules. The word is used in several con-
texts.”). 
187  See RULE 23 MIN-CONFERENCE, supra note 17, at 39 (explaining that “a revision of Rule 
23(f) might afford a discretionary opportunity for immediate appellate review of the resolu-
tion of that issue.”). 
188  Id. at 42. 
189  Id. 
190  RULE 23 SUBCOMM. REPORT, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES AGENDA MATERIALS 
4–5 (2015) (referencing draft Rule 23(f) amendments in its conclusion that “[o]n balance, 
these issues appear not to warrant amendment of the rules”). 
191  See., e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, An Empirical Study of Class Action Settlements and Their 
Fee Awards, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 811, 812 (2010) (observing that “virtually all cases 
certified as class actions and not dismissed before trial end in settlement”); Thomas Willging 
& Emery G. Lee III, Class Certification and Class Settlement: Findings from Federal Ques-
tion Cases, 2003–2007, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 315, 341–42 (2011). 
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amendments added the word “issues” to Rule 23(e),192 but the process for set-
tling an “issue” on behalf of a class is uncharted territory.193 In other words, 
may a Rule 23(c)(4) issue class certified only for the litigation of potentially 
non-predominating common issues nonetheless be settled in a way that encom-
passes the entirety of class members’ claims? This is not a subject that has gar-
nered much interest, nor has it often arisen given the dearth of issue class action 
certifications thus far.  
 According to one class action scholar, the standards for certifying a Rule 
23(c)(4) issue class cannot be bootstrapped into approval of a settlement class 
purporting to compromise the entirety of class claims.194 For one thing, such a 
settlement class could “raise new intra-class conflicts,” as it encompasses pre-
viously excluded issues on which class members’ interests may diverge.195 Am-
chem has already addressed the need for settlement classes to comply with Rule 
23(b)(3) predominance, and called for “heightened” scrutiny of other Rule 23 
criteria.196 Certainly a settlement class could not so easily evade these safe-
guards by the mere invocation of Rule 23(c)(4). 
D.   Rule 23(h) Attorney Fees 
 Finally, the current Rule 23(h) instructs courts to determine, with hearings 
if necessary, the proper amount of compensation to be awarded to class counsel 
in the event of a class judgment or a settlement between the parties.197 In the 
event of a litigated issue class action, however, there will not be a money 
judgment for the class from which to compensate class counsel.198 The remain-
                                                        
192  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(1)(A) advisory committee’s note to 2003 amendment (“Subdi-
vision (e)(1)(A) expressly recognizes the power of the class representative to settle class 
claims, issues, or defenses.”); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 15, § 1753.1. 
193  See, e.g., Seiner, supra note 6, at 155 (opining that because “the adverse resolution of a 
particular issue may still permit the [defendant] to avoid liability and/or substantial damages 
in the case, . . . [defendants] therefore may not be as eager to settle a case certified under 
Rule 23(c)(4)”). 
194  Burch, supra note 5, at 1889 (cautioning that “certifying an issue class should not be-
come a backdoor to plenary certification via a settlement class action. If judges conduct their 
issue class inquiry as this Article suggests, then certifying a settlement class must entail a 
separate Rule 23 analysis.”). 
195  Id. 
196  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 620 (1997) (“[O]ther specifications of 
[Rule 23]—those designed to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class 
definitions—demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement context. Such 
attention is of vital importance, for a court asked to certify a settlement class will lack the 
opportunity, present when a case is litigated, to adjust the class, informed by the proceedings 
as they unfold.”). 
197  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). 
198  See Burch, supra note 5, at 1908 (“There is, however, little to no precedent for awarding 
fees once counsel successfully litigates an issue class.”). 
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ing liability and damages issues would require adjudication separately and pos-
sibly in other venues.199 
 Issue class counsel compensation is a novel topic for courts, representing 
yet another issue class procedure for which the current Rule 23 is poorly 
equipped to address. Professor Elizabeth Burch has recently written a compre-
hensive treatment of the tension between the need to incentivize attorneys to 
bring issue class actions and the perils of awarding attorney fees for work that 
often will not immediately result in compensation for the class.200 She proposes 
a number of thoughtful suggestions for providing doctrinal justification for al-
locating attorney fees, including judgment liens201 and common benefit princi-
ples.202 Unfortunately, such attorney compensation schemes must rest solely on 
the uncertain and dissimilar whims of district court judges rather than on a pro-
cedure deliberated upon and clearly stated in an amendment to Rule 23(h). 
CONCLUSION 
 The issue class action enjoys such widespread acceptance and appreciation, 
but it has not undergone the thorough vetting and rulemaking consideration that 
it deserves. If the Committee supports the adoption of an issue class action, it 
must first tackle the necessary amendments to incorporate this novel device. 
The most obvious, of course, is the language codifying the criteria under which 
an issue class action may be certified. The Committee can be guided by the ef-
forts of several courts of appeals that have already set out to articulate the issue 
class action standard. The Seventh Circuit’s approach, in my view, is not only 
difficult to codify because of its risk/benefit analysis that may defy elaboration, 
but also because its applicability only to low value cases renders untenable the 
notion of subsequent individualized lawsuits to capitalize on the issue class ac-
tion findings on the common issue or issues. 
 The material advancement test may be the easiest to articulate, but would 
seemingly focus exclusively on the significance of the issue certified rather 
than the complexities of that issue, the conflicts of laws, and other convenience 
and fairness factors that might render issue certification improper. The multi-
factor test may best identify those additional sets of important considerations, 
yet it is too lengthy and unwieldy to incorporate into Rule 23 and it gives little 
guidance regarding the relative weight of each factor. The material advance-
ment language, due to its familiarity and widest adoption, may be considered 
with accompanying descriptions of the factors in the Gates test and explana-
tions of how those factors ought to be weighed and applied in exemplar cases. 
                                                        
199  See id. at 1905–06 (“[I]ssue classes are uniquely situated because they do not immediate-
ly produce a common fund from which successful class counsel can recover.”). 
200  See id. at 1916 (“Ensuring mechanisms to award issue-class counsel’s fees incentivizes 
issue classes and evens out the typical resource imbalance between a single plaintiff and a 
corporate defendant.”). 
201  See id. at 1908–10. 
202  See id. at 1910–13. 
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 The remaining amendments to Rule 23(c)(2) and (3), (e) and (h) may not 
prove overly complicated, but the matter of the constitutional reach of an issue 
class action settlement that encompasses aspects of plaintiffs’ claims over 
which the court has not exercised jurisdiction is significantly problematic such 
that the Committee should give it close consideration and consult constitutional 
scholars to resolve. If the settlement of an issue class action may not properly 
include class damages claims under current jurisdiction law, one option may be 
to send out separate settlement notices that may accomplish the same construc-
tive consent that the Court approved in Shutts. 
 In any event, because issue class actions have flown under the radar for so 
long, and remained a controversial Rule 23 power, the Advisory Committee 
would benefit enormously from the contributions of courts that have already 
attempted to grapple with some of the certification and logistic challenges 
posed by the issue class action, as well as the contributions of scholars and 
practitioners. 
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